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Abstract
We study the strategic relationship between hospital investment in health technologies and
provision of service quality. We use a spatial competition framework with altruistic providers
and allow for hospital investment and quality provision to be either complements or substitutes
in the patient health benet and provider cost functions. We assume that each hospital commits
to a certain investment level before deciding on the provision of service quality. We show that,
compared to a simultaneous-move benchmark, providerslack of ability to commit to a particular
quality level generally leads to either under- or overinvestment. Underinvestment arises when
the price-cost margin is positive and when quality and investments are strategic complements. In
turn, this has implications for the optimal design of hospital payment contracts. We show that,
di¤erently from the simultaneous-move case, the rst-best solution is generally not attainable by
setting the xed price at the appropriate level, but the regulator must complement the payment
contract with at least one more instrument to address under- or overinvestment. We also analyse
the welfare e¤ects of di¤erent policy options (separate payment for investment, through a higher
per-treatment price, or renement of pricing) to reimburse hospitals for their investments.
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1 Introduction
Investments in medical innovations and new technologies can improve the e¢ cacy of treatments and
enhance patient outcomes (Fuchs and Sox, 2001; Cutler and McClellan, 2001), and in some cases
reduce the cost of providing medical care. For example, laparoscopic surgery can both improve
health outcomes and reduce length of stay and treatment costs, leading to substantial e¢ ciency
gains in service provision, therefore freeing up resources to improve care for other patients. But
costly investments can also put pressure on the sustainability of health spending in publicly-funded
health systems (Smith et al., 2009; OECD, 2010). In 2018, EU member states allocated around
0.4 percent of their GDP on capital investment in the health sector. Similarly, the European
Structural and Investment Funds provided more than EUR 9 billion to member states for health-
related investments in 2014-2020 (OECD, 2020).
Hospital spending accounts for a signicant share of health spending, about 39% in 2018 across
the EU. The dominant payment model for hospitals across the OECD is activity-based funding,
where hospitals are reimbursed a xed price based on a Diagnosis Related Group (DRG) for each
patient treated. Hospitals compete on quality to attract patients with higher quality leading to
higher demand and higher revenues. There is instead more variety in the arrangements used to
reimburse hospitals for their investments. These can take the form of separate supplementary
payments, either as additional funding or retrospective reimbursement (Scheller-Kreinsen et al.,
2011). Alternatively, the investment cost can be covered and included in the DRG xed price, or it
can be taken into account when designing DRG groups, for example by splitting an existing DRG or
by establishing a new DRG, especially when the new technologies increase costs for a well-dened
subset of patients (Quentin et al., 2011; HOPE, 2006).
Despite the importance of hospital investments, there is limited understanding of how hospitals
make investment decisions, and in turn how these decisions a¤ect the provision of care. This study
develops a theoretical model to investigate how hospitals investment decisions are a¤ected by
di¤erent payment arrangements. We do so in a general environment where hospitals also compete
for patients based on the quality of care they provide, which allows us to explore the interaction
between investment and service quality. We address several questions. What determines hospitals
incentives to invest in new medical technology, and do these incentives lead to underinvestment or
overinvestment? Similarly, do hospitals investment incentives lead to under- or overprovision of
quality of care? What is the optimal payment contract and what are the welfare implications of
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di¤erent policies regarding payment for medical innovations?
In order to answer these questions, we use a spatial competition framework where hospitals
are partly altruistic and we allow for investment and service quality to be either substitutes or
complements in the health benet and cost functions. We also assume that hospitals are nanced
by a third-party payer with a per-treatment price and a lump-sum transfer, where each of the
policy instruments might depend on the level of investment. As a benchmark, we derive the
equilibrium levels of investment and service quality under the assumption that these decisions
are made simultaneously. We then proceed by considering the arguably more realistic setting of
a two-stage game, where each hospital commits to a certain investment level before deciding on
the provision of service quality. A key question addressed in this part of our analysis is whether
sequential decision making leads to over- or underinvestment, and we nd that the answer to this
question depends crucially on two di¤erent factors: (i) whether the treatment price is higher or
lower than the marginal treatment cost in equilibrium, which in turn depends on the degree of
provider altruism, and (ii) whether increased investment by one hospital will spur an increase or a
reduction in the quality provision of the competing hospital. If the price-cost margin is positive, we
show that hospitals underinvest (overinvest) if own investment and the quality of the competing
hospital are strategic complements (substitutes). On the other hand, if the price-cost margin
is negative, strategic substitutability leads to underinvestment whereas strategic complementarity
leads to overinvestment. Whether own investment and rivals quality are strategic substitutes
or complements depends in turn on the characteristics of the hospital cost and patient benet
functions.
In the second part of the paper we o¤er a welfare analysis. A key underlying assumption is
that, although service quality is observable, it is not veriable and thus not contractible (La¤ont
and Martimort, 2009). Investments, on the other hand, are both observable and veriable. Thus,
regulators can design payment contracts based on investment with the purpose of indirectly incen-
tivising quality improvements, which is one of the key objectives of hospital regulation. We start
out by deriving the rst-best solution and show that it can be implemented by a simple payment
contract, consisting only of a xed DRG tari¤, as long as investment and quality choices are made
simultaneously. However, if these decisions are made sequentially, the rst-best solution is generally
not attainable, since the price that induces the rst-best quality level will lead to either under- or
overinvestment. In this case, the regulator must complement the payment contract with at least
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one more instrument to correctly incentivise investments, either through a lump-sum payment or
a treatment price which depends on investment. We show that the regulator has to incentivise
investment when (i) investment and quality are strategic complements and the provider works at a
positive price cost-margin, or (ii) investment and quality are strategic substitutes and the provider
works at a negative price cost margin.
Finally, under the realistic assumption that payment contracts do not generally coincide with the
ones that implement the rst-best solution, we study the welfare e¤ects of several plausible policies
and payment mechanisms. First, we show that the introduction of a separate payment which
directly incentivises investment can be welfare improving if, for example, investment and quality
are initially below the rst-best levels and investment and quality are complements or if they are
substitutes but the degree of substitutability is su¢ ciently small. Second, we nd that paying
for investments through a higher activity-based tari¤ per patient treated, rather than through a
separate funding scheme, can also be welfare improving if equilibrium investment and quality are
below the rst-best level and a higher DRG tari¤ increases the marginal revenue of both investment
and service quality. Finally, we nd that a policy incentivising investment through renements of
DRG pricing (so that additional investments are rewarded with a higher per unit price) stimulates
quality provision while the e¤ect on investment is, perhaps surprisingly, a priori ambiguous. Since
such a payment scheme reinforces each hospitals incentive to use own investments to strategically
a¤ect the rivals quality provision, this could lead to a counterproductive outcome (i.e., lower
investments) if own investment and rivals quality are strategic complements and providers are
su¢ ciently prot oriented.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In the next section, we discuss the existing
literature. In Section 3, we describe the key assumptions of the model. In Section 4, we derive the
benchmark scenario where decisions on investments and service quality are made simultaneously. In
Section 5, we consider the more realistic scenario of sequential decision making where hospitals rst
decide on investment and then on service quality. Section 6 is devoted to a welfare analysis where
we adopt both a normative approach, to derive the socially optimal level of investment and quality
and optimal regulation, and a more positive approach by investigating possible policy reforms to
incentivise hospital investments. Section 7 concludes and discusses policy implications.
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2 Related Literature
Our study contributes and integrates two strands of the literature. The rst one is the litera-
ture on quality competition in regulated markets, using a spatial framework, where key contribu-
tions include Wolinsky (1997), Gravelle (1999), Beitia (2003), Karlsson (2007) and Brekke et al.
(2007, 2011), among many others. This literature identies the conditions under which competition
amongst providers increases or reduces quality provision under di¤erent assumptions on providers
objective function, including altruistic preferences, non-prot status and costs. Using a similar
spatial framework, but assuming an unregulated market, Brekke et al. (2010) investigate price and
quality competition in a simultaneous-move game. They nd that equilibrium quality is always
below the socially optimal level when the utility function of consumers is concave in consumption,
therefore allowing for the presence of income e¤ects. Incentives for underprovision are reinforced
if instead quality choices are made before price competition takes place, which gives the rms an
incentive to reduce quality provision in order to dampen price competition, as rst shown by Ma
and Burgess (1993). Finally, Brekke et al. (2006) analyse optimal regulation in a sequential-game
framework with location and quality choices and nd that the optimal price induces rst-best qual-
ity, but horizontal di¤erentiation is ine¢ ciently large if the regulator cannot commit to a price
before the location choices. None of these studies makes a distinction between investments and
service quality.1
The second strand of literature investigates investment decisions and implications for regulation
and design of optimal payment systems. One key issue addressed in this literature is the timing of
investment and how this might be a¤ected by di¤erent regulatory schemes. For example, using a
real options approach, Levaggi and Moretto (2008) nd that long-term contracts are more e¤ective
in o¤ering incentives for a provider to invest early. This analysis is extended by Pertile (2008)
to account for cost uncertainty, investigating the optimal timing of investment in new healthcare
technologies by providers competing for patients. The analysis reveals a potentially counterintuitive
relationship between payment characteristics and investment decisions, for example that a more
generous payment scheme does not necessarily lead to earlier investment. In another related study,
Levaggi et al. (2012) address how uncertainty about patients benets a¤ects the incentives to
1There is also a recent literature on multi-stage competition, including quality choices, in mixed oligopolies. For
example, Laine and Ma (2017) use a model of vertical di¤erentiation, where rms rst choose product qualities, then
simultaneously choose prices. Ghandour (forthcoming) investigates quality competition under asymmetric pricing in a
sequential game. Hehenkamp and Kaarbøe (2020) explore location choices and quality competition in mixed hospital
markets. However, a distinction between investments and service quality is not made in any of these papers.
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invest in new technologies. They nd that e¢ ciency can be ensured both in the time of adoption
(dynamic e¢ ciency) and the intensity of use of technology (static e¢ ciency) if reimbursement by the
purchaser includes both a variable (per-patient) component and a lump-sum component.2 A similar
conclusion is reached by Levaggi et al. (2014), who show that it is optimal to pay the provider
based on a xed fee per patient and a lump-sum component to fund capital costs separately, a
result which loosely resembles some of the insights derived in our welfare analysis.
Another key issue, with important regulatory implications, is contractibility. Whereas we in
the present paper assume that investment is a contractible variable while service quality is not, Bös
and De Fraja (2002) consider only non-contractible investments (interpreted as quality). Using an
incomplete contract framework, they focus on the e¤ects of investment by the health care authority
in contingency plans, which give it the option to purchase care from outside providers. In the rst
stage, hospitals choose investment decisions before patients are treated in the second stage. In such
a setting, hospitals underinvest in quality while the health authority overinvests in the contingency
arrangements, as compared to the rst-best outcome.
A common feature of all the above mentioned papers is that quality is a one-dimensional vari-
able which may or may not be modelled as an investment decision, and which may or may not be
contractible. In contrast, we make a conceptual separation between investment in medical tech-
nologies and other dimensions of quality provision, which we subsume under the umbrella term
service quality, assuming that the former is contractible whereas the latter is not. We argue that
this is a meaningful and potentially important conceptual distinction, and the main contribution
of our paper is to study the interaction between investment and quality in healthcare markets.
3 Model
Consider a market for a healthcare treatment o¤ered by two hospitals, denoted by i = f1; 2g,
located at opposite endpoints of a Hotelling line of length 1. Patients are uniformly distributed
on the unit line with a mass of one. Each patient demands one unit of treatment from the most
preferred provider. A patient located at x who is treated at Hospital i has the utility
Ui(x; Ii; qi) = B(Ii; qi)  t jx  zij ; (1)
2 In a non-competitive setting with demand uncertainty, Barros and Martinez-Giralt (2015) also study the rela-
tionship between payment systems and the rate of technology adoption. They nd that a mixed cost reimbursement
system can induce a higher adoption of health technologies compared to the DRG payment system.
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where B(Ii; qi) is patient health benet from treatment, qi is service quality of treatment at Hospital
i, Ii is investment in new technologies, t is the transportation cost per unit of distance, and zi is
hospital location with z1 = 0 and z2 = 1. We assume that the patient health benet is given by




where bq > 0, bI  0 and bIq ? 0, and where the relevant values of qi and Ii are such that
bq + bIqIi > 0 and bI + bIqqi  0, implying that patient health benet is increasing in service
quality and (weakly) increasing in investment. We allow service quality and investment to be
either complements (bIq > 0) or substitutes (bIq < 0) in health benets, so that investments can
amplify or dampen the e¤ect of service quality on health benets.
One example of investment is Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI) machines (Baker, 2001),
which are used to facilitate the diagnosis of a condition or improve its assessment. Such investment
can have both a direct e¤ect on patient health (bI > 0), for example the scan reveals a tumor, and an
indirect e¤ect by allowing to tailor the provision of care to the specic needs of the patients revealed
by the scan, therefore increasing the e¤ectiveness of quality provision (bIq > 0). Another example
is investment in less invasive laparoscopic (endoscopic) technologies used for surgical interventions
(e.g., for removal of gallbladder). The less invasive approach improves health outcomes through
quicker recovery time, less pain, lower risks of complications, infections and transfusions, relative
to more invasive open surgeries. Laparoscopy can also facilitate diagnosis therefore increasing
the e¤ectiveness of quality provision. There is also increasing interest in investment in robotic
minimally invasive surgery which potentially increases precision, and reduces scope for errors.
Suppose that each patient in the market makes a utility-maximising choice of hospital and that
patient health benet is su¢ ciently high to ensure full market coverage. The demand function for
Hospital i is then given by




B(Ii; qi) B(Ij ; qj)
2t
; (3)
with demand for the rival hospital given by Dj(Ii; Ij ; qi; qj) = 1 Di(Ii; Ij ; qi; qj).
The hospital cost function is assumed to be given by
C(Di; Ii; qi) = c(Ii; qi)Di + k(Ii); (4)
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where c(Ii; qi) is the cost per patient treated, which we refer to as marginal treatment costs, and
k(Ii) is the xed cost of investment (e.g., a new MRI machine), which is increasing in investment
and convex, @k(Ii)=@Ii > 0 and @2k(Ii)=@I2i > 0. We assume that marginal treatment costs are
given by




where cq > 0, cI ? 0 and cIq ? 0. We assume that marginal treatment costs of service quality
are positive, 2cqqi + cIqIi > 0, and treatment costs are convex in quality. We allow for service
quality and investment to be either cost complements (cIq < 0) or substitutes (cIq > 0). We
also allow the marginal treatment costs to increase or decrease with higher investment (cI ? 0).
For example, laparoscopic surgery generally reduces the length of stay in hospital, in many cases
allowing same-day discharge, requires fewer medications and only local anesthesia (as opposed to
general anesthesia), therefore reducing the cost of quality provision during hospitalisation. Instead,
investments in robot-assisted surgery as for robotic radical prostatectomy for treatment of localised
prostate cancer can increase treatment costs relative to surgery by hand due to the specialised na-
ture of the equipment (Ramsay et al., 2012; Park et al., 2012). Similarly, investing in MRI machines
is expensive and the MRI scans cost more that CT scans. Therefore, whether investments increase
or decrease treatment costs varies across technologies. Whether quality and investments are com-
plements or substitutes is also in principle indeterminate. Laparoscopy or robotic surgery requires
more doctor training, and can also take longer time than open surgery (especially if preparation
time is included). A better diagnosis through an MRI scan can allow doctors to choose a treatment
which is better suited for patientsneeds therefore reducing unnecessary care, and reducing the
cost of quality provision.
We assume that hospitals are prospectively nanced by a third-party payer with a per-treatment
price p(Ii) and a xed budget component or lump-sum transfer equal to T (Ii). The xed budget
component ensures providersparticipation in the market. Moreover, most countries use some form
of payment that entails additional funding to hospitals to cover certain investments in technologies,
including retrospective reimbursement of hospital reported costs outside the DRG price system
(Sorenson et al., 2015). We therefore assume that the xed budget component can be either
independent of investment, @T (Ii)=@Ii = 0, or increasing in investment, @T=@Ii > 0, where part or
all of the cost of new investments are reimbursed by the funder.
If the price is xed (as in most DRG payment schemes) then @p=@Ii = 0. Although the price
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is xed in this scenario, the price level can still vary depending on whether the payment system is
designed to cover the investment costs. Some countries pay a higher xed price which is meant to
include investments costs, while others pay a lower price which is meant to cover treatment costs
only (Scheller-Kreinsen et al., 2011). We also allow for the possibility that the price is increasing
in investment, @p(Ii)=@Ii > 0. This assumption is consistent with payment mechanisms that allow
DRGs to be split when a new technology becomes available (Quentin et al., 2011; HOPE, 2006).
Lastly, we assume that the regulator is able to pre-commit to a particular reimbursement
policy for investments in health technologies. The hospital payment scheme described above relies
on the assumption that investment in medical machinery and technology is veriable, and thus
contractible, while the hospitalsprovision of service quality is not.3 This assumption implies that
hospital payments can be made contingent on investment. The hospitalsprovision of quality, on
the other hand, can only be indirectly incentivised, either through the per-treatment price, p, which
a¤ects the hospitalsincentives to attract demand, or through the payment for investment, T (Ii),
which a¤ects the marginal benets and costs of quality provision via changes in the hospitals
investment decisions (if bIq 6= 0 and cIq 6= 0).
The nancial surplus of Hospital i, denoted i, is given by
i(Ii; Ij ; qi; qj) = T (Ii) + [p(Ii)  c(Ii; qi)]Di(Ii; Ij ; qi; qj)  k(Ii): (6)
In line with the existing literature (e.g., Ellis and McGuire, 1986; Chalkley and Malcomson, 1998)
we assume that hospitals are partly altruistic and care about the health benet of the average
patient. The objective function of Hospital i, denoted by Vi, is thus given by
Vi(Ii; Ij ; qi; qj) = B(Ii; qi) + i(Ii; Ij ; qi; qj); (7)
where  is a positive parameter measuring the degree of provider altruism.
4 Simultaneous choices of investment and quality
As a benchmark for comparison, suppose that both hospitals choose investment in technology and
service quality simultaneously. The Nash equilibrium is implicitly characterised by the rst-order
3More precisely, we assume that quality is observable but not veriable, and thus not contractible.
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conditions for hospital choice of qi and Ii given by















Di(Ii; Ij ; qi; qj) = 0; (8)





















Di(Ii; Ij ; qi; qj) 
@k(Ii)
@Ii
= 0 : (9)
The second-order conditions are provided in the Appendix A1. The optimal level of service quality
is set such that the marginal benet from the altruistic health gain and the marginal revenue is
traded-o¤ against the higher costs from higher demand and higher per-patient treatment costs.
The optimal level of investment is analogous. The marginal benet from investment includes the
altruistic health gain and the marginal revenues from higher demand, and potentially also a higher
price and higher lump-sum transfer. Investment is optimally provided when the sum of marginal
benet is equal to marginal treatment costs from higher demand and the marginal investment cost
(higher xed costs), given by the nal term in (9). Investment also a¤ects per-patient cost, which
will contribute to the marginal benet of investments if cost reducing, cI+cIqqi < 0, or the marginal
cost if cost augmenting, cI + cIqqi > 0.
At the symmetric equilibrium both hospitals choose quality and investment (denoted by q and









































= 0 : (11)
We use these expressions to compare the equilibrium under sequential choices, derived in the next
section.
4An interior solution with a positive level of service quality requires that the per-unit price p is su¢ ciently high.
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5 Sequential choices of investment and quality
In this section, we make the arguably more realistic assumption that hospitals make their investment
decisions before the treatment quality decisions. This modelling approach is plausible given that
investment decisions take time and are infrequent and hospitals invest before starting to treat
patients, which is when service quality is provided. We therefore consider the following two-stage
game:
Stage 1 Both providers choose simultaneously how much to invest.
Stage 2 Both providers simultaneously choose their service quality.
As usual, the game is solved by backward induction.
5.1 Quality competition
For a given pair of investment levels (Ii; Ij), the level of service quality that maximises the payo¤
of Hospital i is implicitly given by (8), and an analogous condition holds for Hospital j. In order to
determine how the investment made by Hospital i a¤ects the quality chosen by the two hospitals,
we totally di¤erentiate the system of rst-order conditions given by @Vi (Ii; Ij ; qi; qj) =@qi = 0 and
















































































where  > 0 is given by (A16) in Appendix A2.1. The sign of (12) determines whether investment
and quality for Hospital i are substitutes (@qi=@Ii < 0) or complements (@qi=@Ii > 0). The sign of
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(13) determines whether the investment of Hospital is and the quality of Hospital j are strategic
substitutes (@qj=@Ii < 0) or strategic complements (@qj=@Ii > 0). Both of these expressions have
an a priori indeterminate sign.
As a benchmark, consider the case in which Ii and qi are neither complements nor substitutes
in costs (cIq = 0) and benets (bIq = 0), and where any increase in the marginal cost of investments
is exactly o¤set by a marginal increase in price so that the price-cost margin remains unchanged















3 (bq)2 qjqi + 4t (Djqibq +Diqjbq + tDiDj)
> 0: (15)
Thus, own investment and own quality are substitute strategies (i.e., @qi=@Ii < 0) whereas own
investment and rivals quality are strategic complements (i.e., @qj=@Ii > 0). The intuition for this is
fairly straightforward. All else equal, higher investment by Hospital i shifts demand from Hospital
j to Hospital i (as long as bI > 0). Because marginal treatment costs are increasing in quality, such
a demand shift leads to higher (lower) marginal cost of quality provision for Hospital i (Hospital
j), as can be seen from the third term in (8). Consequently, a higher investment by Hospital i leads
to lower (higher) service quality by Hospital i (Hospital j), all else equal.
The e¤ects in this benchmark scenario can be either reinforced or weakened by the presence
of three additional e¤ects. First, if higher investment increases (reduces) the price-cost margin of
Hospital i, this will increase (reduce) the protability of attracting more demand by o¤ering higher
service quality, thus leading to higher (lower) quality o¤ered by Hospital i, all else equal. Second, if
investment and quality are complements (substitutes) in the benet function (i.e., if bIq > (<) 0),
this will increase (reduce) both the demand responsiveness and the marginal health benet gain of
quality provision, thus leading to higher (lower) quality o¤ered by Hospital i, all else equal. Third,
if investment and quality are complements (substitutes) in the cost function (i.e., if cIq < (>) 0),
this will reduce (increase) the marginal cost of quality provision, thus leading to higher (lower)
quality chosen by Hospital i, all else equal.
Each of these three additional e¤ects work in the same direction for both @qi=@Ii and @qj=@Ii.
In other words, an e¤ect that establishes a ceteris paribus positive e¤ect of Ii on qi also implies a
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ceteris paribus positive e¤ect of Ii on qj . The reason is that qualities are strategic complements







=2t > 0 (see
Appendix A2.1). This strategic relationship is due to the assumption that the marginal cost of
quality provision increases with demand (@2C=@Di@qi = 2cqqi + cIqIi > 0). All else equal, higher
quality provision by Hospital i leads to lower demand for Hospital j, which reduces the marginal
cost of quality provision and thus increases the optimal quality choice for the latter hospital.
Finally, note that it is possible for own investment and quality to be complements, @qi=@Ii > 0.
This arises for example if investment has no e¤ect on health benets, but reduces costs, and benet






























In the rst stage of the game, hospitals decide how much to invest, taking into account the e¤ect
that the investment will have on quality decisions of both hospitals in the second stage. The
rst-order condition for Hospital i is given by

















































The second order condition is provided in Appendix A2.2. The rst line and the rst two terms in
the second line in (18) are identical to the investment condition in the simultaneous-move version
of the game given by (9). The two additional terms in the second and third line of (18) capture
the strategic e¤ects of Hospital is investment on the quality choices of both hospitals. However,
the third line in (18) is equal to zero due to the envelope theorem; given that Hospital i chooses a
payo¤-maximising quality level, the expression in the square bracket is zero (see (8)).
Applying symmetry, quality and investment in the symmetric subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium
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Comparing (10) and (19), we see that equilibrium quality is identical under the simultaneous and
sequential solution if and only if I = I. On the other hand, equilibrium investment is generally
di¤erent when q = q. Comparing (11) and (20), the di¤erence in the investment conditions
is given by the last term in (20), which captures the strategic e¤ect of own investment on the
competing hospitals quality choice in the second stage. It follows that equilibrium investment
and quality are the same under simultaneous and sequential decision making (i.e., q = q and
I = I) only if the investment of Hospital i has no strategic e¤ect on the quality choice of Hospital
j (i.e., if @qj (I) =@Ii = 0).
Whether hospitals have an incentive to over- or underinvest in medical technology depends
on the sign of @qj (I) =@Ii and the price-cost margin, p(I)   c(I; q), which can be pos-
itive or negative depending on the degree of altruism.5 Suppose that the price cost margin is
5To see that this is the case, we can re-write
Vq(I
; q) = 0
as
p(I)  c(I; q) = 2t

2cqq + cIqI





positive in equilibrium. There is underinvestment if own investment and rivals quality choice
are strategic complements (@qj (I) =@Ii > 0) and overinvestment if they are strategic substitutes
(@qj (I) =@Ii < 0). The intuition is related to the strategic complementarity of quality choices
in the second-stage subgame (i.e., @2Vi=@qi@qj > 0). If @qj=@Ii > 0, each hospital has a strategic
incentive to reduce investment at the rst stage of the game in order to dampen quality competi-
tion at the second stage. These incentives are reversed if @qj=@Ii < 0, which implies that quality
competition can be dampened by increasing investment. The results are however reversed if the
price-cost margin is negative, which requires a su¢ ciently high degree of altruism.
We summarise this rst result in the following proposition:
Proposition 1 Hospitals underinvest in a sequential game, relative to a simultaneous game, if
(i) the price-cost margin is positive, p(I)   c(I; q) > 0, and investments and rivals quality
are strategic complements, @qj (I) =@Ii > 0, or if (ii) the price-cost margin is negative, p(I)  
c(I; q) < 0, and investments and rivals quality are strategic substitutes, @qj (I) =@Ii < 0:
Hospitals overinvest if (i) the price-cost margin is positive, p(I) c(I; q) > 0, and investments
and rivals quality are strategic substitutes, @qj (I) =@Ii < 0, or if (ii) the price-cost margin is
negative, p(I)   c(I; q) < 0, and investments and rivals quality are strategic complements,
@qj (I
) =@Ii > 0.
We now turn to the comparison of quality. Whether the hospitals over- or under-provide quality
relative to the simultaneous game, depends on whether investment and quality are complements or





























> 0, quality and
investment are always complements if they are complements in health benets and costs, but
the scope for complementarity instead reduces if investment and quality are substitutes in health
benets and costs.
We summarise our second result in the following proposition:
Proposition 2 Quality is underprovided in a sequential game, relative to a simultaneous game, if
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(i) hospitals underinvest, and investment and quality are complements, @Vq(I; q)=@I > 0, or if
(ii) hospitals overinvest, and investment and quality are substitutes, @Vq(I; q)=@I < 0. Instead,
quality is overprovided if (i) hospitals underinvest, and investment and quality are substitutes,
@Vq(I
; q)=@I < 0, or if (ii) hospitals overinvest, and investment and quality are complements,
@Vq(I
; q)=@I > 0:
To gain some further insights on whether sequential decision making leads to higher or lower
investments, and higher or lower quality provision, we will consider a few special cases which allow
us to isolate each of the di¤erent mechanisms at play and link them to the basic assumptions of
our model. In each case, the results depend on whether each hospitals price-cost margin is positive
or negative in equilibrium, which in turn depends on the degree of altruism. More specically, the
price-cost margin is positive if the hospitals are su¢ ciently prot-oriented, and negative if they are
su¢ ciently altruistic:
p(I)  c(I; q) > (<) 0 if  < (>) b := 2cqq + cIqI
2 (bq + bIqI)
: (23)
We present the di¤erent cases as four separate Lemmas, starting with what we have previously
referred to as a benchmark case.
Lemma 1 Suppose that investment and quality are cost and benet independent (cIq = bIq =
0), and that investments have no e¤ect on the price-cost margin (@p(I)=@I   cI = 0). In this
case, quality provision is identical under sequential and simultaneous choices, whereas hospitals
underinvest in the sequential game if  < b and overinvest if  > b.
In the benchmark case, where investment and quality are independent in the health benet and
costs functions, and where investments do not a¤ect the price-cost margin, the equilibrium level of
investments have no e¤ect on each hospitals incentive for quality provision, i.e., @Vq(I; q)=@I =
0, which implies that equilibrium quality provision is the same in the two versions of the game.
Investment incentives, on the other hand, are a¤ected through the term @qj (I) =@Ii, which is
unambiguously positive in the benchmark case. All else equal, higher investment by one hospital
leads to higher quality provision by the competing hospital, because of lower marginal cost of
quality provision caused by lower demand. This creates a strategic incentive in the sequential game
that a¤ects the optimal investment decision. As long as the price-cost margin is positive, each
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hospital has an incentive to attract more patients by inducing a lower quality provision from the
competing hospital, and this can be achieved by underinvesting at the rst stage of the game. Such
an incentive exists if the hospitals are su¢ ciently prot-oriented.
However, if the hospitals are su¢ ciently altruistic, so that the price-cost margin is negative
in equilibrium, the investment incentives are the exact opposite. In this case, each hospital has
an incentive to reduce demand (from unprotable patients) by inducing a higher quality provision
from the competing hospital, which can be achieved by overinvesting at the rst stage. Notice,
however, that since both hospitals have the same unilateral incentive to use the investment decision
to strategically a¤ect quality provision, these incentives cancel each other in equilibrium, leaving
equilibrium quality provision unchanged.
Lemma 2 Suppose that investment and quality are (weak) complements in the health benet and
cost functions, and that the price-cost margin is weakly increasing in investments: (i) bIq  0,




 0. If at least one of the inequalities in (i)-(iii)
is strict, then investment and quality provision are both lower (higher) in the sequential game if
 < (>)b.
Similar to the benchmark case, assumptions (i)-(iii) in Lemma 2 ensure that there is strategic
complementarity between own investment and rivals quality provision, i.e. @qj (I) =@Ii > 0. This
implies that the hospitals incentives for under- or overinvestment are qualitatively the same as in
the benchmark case (cf. Lemma 1). However, in contrast to the benchmark case, the introduc-
tion of these assumptions implies that investment and quality are equilibrium complements, i.e.,
@Vq(I
; q)=@I > 0, which implies that the strategic investment e¤ect also a¤ects equilibrium
quality provision. More specically, higher (lower) investments also imply higher (lower) equilib-
rium quality provision. Thus, depending on the degree of hospital altruism, investment and quality
are either both higher or both lower in the sequential game.
Notice that only one of the assumptions in (i)-(iii) is needed in order to produce the results
given by Lemma 2 (given that the other assumptions are as in the benchmark case of Lemma
1). One example that ts this case is laparoscopic (less invasive) surgery, which improves health
outcomes for a given treatment quality and reduces treatment costs, and accordingly the marginal
cost of quality provision.
Lemma 3 Suppose that investment and quality are substitutes in the health benet and cost func-
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tions (bIq < 0 and cIq > 0), and that the price-cost margin is decreasing in investments (@p(I)=@I  
cI + cIqq

< 0). Suppose also that all of these e¤ects are smallin magnitude. In this case, in
the sequential game hospitals underinvest while overproviding quality if  < b and overinvest while
underproviding quality if  > b.
This case di¤ers from the previous one in that investment and quality are equilibrium sub-
stitutes, implying that overinvestment will be accompanied by underprovision of quality, while
underinvestment will lead to overprovision of quality. Notice that for investment and quality to be





given that other assumptions are as in the benchmark case. As long as all of these e¤ects are
su¢ ciently small, strategic complementarity between own investment and rivals quality remains,
which implies that the investment incentives are as in the benchmark case.
Lemma 4 Suppose that investment and quality are substitutes in the health benet and cost func-
tions (bIq < 0 and cIq > 0), and that the price-cost margin is decreasing in investments (@p(I)=@I  
cI + cIqq

< 0). Suppose also that at least one of these e¤ects is large in magnitude. In this
case, in the sequential game hospitals overinvest while underproviding quality if  < b and under-
invest while overproviding quality if  > b.
In our nal case considered, we assume that the degree of benet or cost substitutability between
investment and quality is so large that the strategic nature of the game changes, making own
investment and rivals quality strategic substitutes, i.e., @qj (I) =@Ii < 0. Alternatively, strategic
substitutability could also arise if investments have a su¢ ciently large negative e¤ect on the price-
cost margin, for example investments that lead to considerably higher treatment costs. This changes
the strategic investment incentives relative to the benchmark case. If the hospitals are su¢ ciently
prot-oriented, so that the equilibrium price-cost margin is positive, each hospital has an incentive
to invest more in order to induce lower quality from the rival hospital at the quality competition
stage. The opposite incentives apply if the price-cost margin is negative, which requires that the
hospitals are su¢ ciently altruistic. As in the case considered by Lemma 3, the incentives for quality
provision follow from the fact that investment and quality are equilibrium substitutes.
The special cases covered by Lemma 1-4 are summarised in Table 1.
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@I If  < b : If  > b :
(I) 0 0 0 > 0 0 I < I; q = q I > I; q = q
(II) > 0 > 0 < 0 > 0 > 0 I < I; q < q I > I; q > q
(III) < 0 (s) < 0 (s) > 0 (s) > 0 < 0 I < I; q > q I > I; q < q
(IV) < 0 (l) < 0 (l) > 0 (l) < 0 < 0 I > I; q < q I < I; q > q
s = smallin absolute value; l = largein absolute value
6 Social Welfare
In this section we present a welfare analysis in two parts. In the rst part, we adopt a normative
approach. We derive the rst-best solution and show how this solution could be implemented
through an optimal design of the payment contract. In the second part, we take a more positive
approach by acknowledging that hospital payment schemes are often based on average-cost pricing
rules and are unlikely to coincide with the optimal ones that maximise welfare. In this second
part we analyse instead the welfare e¤ects of several plausible policy reforms, which we dene as
switching between di¤erent types of hospital payment schemes that we observe across countries.
As the basis of our analysis in this section, we dene social welfare, denoted by W , as the
di¤erence between aggregate patient utility and providerscosts, given by
W (Ii; Ij ; qi; qj) = $  
2X
i=1





(v +B(Ii; qi)  tx) dx+
Z 1
Di(Ii;Ij ;qi;qj)
(v +B(Ij ; qj)  t (1  x)) dx: (25)
is aggregate patient utility.
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6.1 The rst-best solution
Suppose that a welfarist regulator is able to choose investment, quality and demand for each
hospital. Since the model is symmetric and aggregate transportation costs are minimised when
each patient attends the nearest hospital, the rst-best solution must necessarily be symmetric
with equal investment and quality provision for each provider. Imposing symmetry, social welfare
can be expressed as
W (I; q) = v +B(I; q)  t
4
  c(I; q)  2k(I): (26)
Maximising (26) with respect to service quality and investment, we obtain the rst best solution,
denoted by (qs; Is), and implicitly given by6
@W (I; q)
@q















The socially optimal levels of investment and quality are characterised by the standard condition
that marginal benets equal marginal costs. The investment and quality levels given by (27)-(28)
can be implemented as an equilibrium outcome by an appropriate design of the hospital payment
scheme. However, the optimal payment contract depends on the characteristics of the game played
by the hospitals, i.e., whether investment and quality decisions are made simultaneously or sequen-
tially. A comparison of (27)-(28) with (10)-(11) and (19)-(20), respectively, allows us to reach the
following conclusions:
Proposition 3 (i) If investment and quality decisions are made simultaneously, the rst-best so-
lution can be implemented by a payment contract
nbp (Ii) ; bT (Ii)o, where








with (I; q) implicitly given by (10)-(11).
6Second order conditions are provided in Appendix A3.
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(ii) If investment and quality decisions are made sequentially, the rst-best solution can be
implemented by a payment contract
nep (Ii) ; eT (Ii)o, where














with (I; q) implicitly given by (19)-(20) and @qj (I) =@Ii given by (21).
The rst part of the proposition shows that, if hospitals make investment and quality decisions
simultaneously, the rst-best solution can be implemented by a very simple payment contract that
just species an appropriate level of the per-treatment price. If this price is set at the level given
by (29), the hospitals will both invest and provide quality at the rst-best level. Thus, it is possible
for the regulator to kill two birds with one stone, and no other regulatory instruments are needed
to achieve the rst-best outcome.
The intuition for this result is the following. The optimal rst-best quality and investment de-
pend on their marginal patient benets, @B=@qi and @B=@Ii, respectively. The equilibrium quality
and investment, on the other hand, depend inter alia on how strongly demand responds to changes
in quality and investment. However, the demand responsiveness to quality and investment also
depend on their respective marginal patient benets. Thus, both the rst-best and the equilibrium
levels of quality and investment are proportional to their marginal patient benets. Moreover, since
the degree of demand responsiveness of both quality and investment depends on the same trans-
portation cost parameter, t, which we can interpret as an inverse measure of competition intensity,
the providersincentives for providing quality relative to investment are exactly proportional to the
social planners relative valuation of quality and investment, for any given treatment price p. The
regulator can therefore vary the price to stimulate both quality and investment proportionally up
to the rst best levels.
As intuitively expected, and as seen from (29), the optimal price is inversely proportional
to the degree of provider altruism. The rst-best solution is implemented with a price above
(below) marginal treatment costs if  is below (above) one half. How the optimal price depends on
competition intensity also depends on the degree of altruism. If the degree of altruism is relatively
low ( < 1=2), so that the price-cost margin in the rst-best solution is positive, more competition
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stimulates investments and quality provision and the optimal price must therefore be adjusted
downwards. On the other hand, if the degree of altruism is su¢ ciently high ( > 1=2), increased
competition leads to a reduction in quality provision and investments because of a negative price-
cost margin, which implies that the optimal price must be adjusted upwards in order to preserve
the rst-best outcome.
The conclusion that the optimal payment contract only needs to specify the per-treatment price
no longer holds if investment and quality decisions are made sequentially. In this case, the price p
that induces the rst-best level of quality will lead to either under- or overinvestment, where the
conditions for one or the other to occur are given by Proposition 1. Thus, the hospitalsinability to
commit to a particular level of quality provision can be identied as a source of ine¢ ciency which
necessitates a richer set of regulatory tools in order to implement the rst-best outcome. The
optimal payment contract must therefore be complemented by at least one more instrument which
incentivises investments separately. This can be done by making either the lump-sum payment or
the per-treatment price dependent on investment; i.e., @T=@Ii 6= 0 or @p=@Ii 6= 0.7
Notice that the optimal per-treatment price (at equilibrium) remains the same under the se-
quential game and the simultaneous game, while it is the dependence of the per-treatment price or
the lump-sum payment on investment which allows to correct for possible under- or over-investment
under the sequential game. To further illustrate this result, suppose that the payment contract is
such that both the per-treatment price and the lump-sum transfer are linear in investment, i.e.,
p (Ii) = p0 + p1Ii and T (Ii) = T0 + T1Ii. The rst-best solution can then be implemented in two
di¤erent ways. (i) A simple optimal payment rule is such that bp0 = ep0 = c (Is; qs) + (1  2)t andbp1 = ep1 = 0, for both the simultaneous and the sequential game. Instead, this optimal payment
involves bT1 = 0 for the simultaneous game, and eT1 = (1=2  )  bq + bIqIs (@qj (Is) =@Ii) in the
sequential game. This payment involves only a xed per-treatment price under both games, and a
lump-sum transfer which either increases or decreases in investment under the sequential game. (ii)
An alternative optimal payment is such that bp0 = c (Is; qs)+(1 2)t and bp1 = bT1 = 0 under the si-
multaneous game, whereas ep0 = c (Is; qs)+(1 2)t ep1Is, ep1 = (1  2)  bq + bIqIs (@qj (Is) =@Ii)
and eT1 = 0 under the sequential game. This payment still involves only a xed per-treatment price
under the simultaneous game, but a per-treatment price which either increases or decreases in
investment in the sequential game. More specically, this payment scheme implies ep0 6= bp0 and
7Some countries, such as France, Italy and Poland, use a payment contract that implements two instruments,
where the reimbursement of capital cost is separate from the DRG tari¤.
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ep1 6= 0 for Ii 6= Is and ep0 = bp0 and ep1 = 0 for I = Is.
Exactly how the optimal payment scheme should be designed in relation to the investment
component depends on the level of hospital altruism and on the strategic relationship between
investment and quality. Suppose that own investment and rivals quality are strategic complements
(@qj=@Ii > 0). If in addition the hospitals are su¢ ciently prot oriented ( < 1=2), the rst-best
payment scheme should include an investment subsidy to counteract hospital incentive to underin-
vest, either through the lump-sum directly (@T=@Ii > 0) or the per-treatment price (@p=@Ii > 0).
On the other hand, if the hospitals are su¢ ciently altruistic ( > 1=2), so that the price-cost mar-
gin is negative in equilibrium, the rst-best outcome is achieved by disincentivising investment, for
example by making T a decreasing function of I. The opposite results hold when investment and
rivals quality are strategic substitutes. If the price-cost margin is positive, the rst-best payment
scheme disincentivises investment. If the price cost margin is negative, the payment scheme incen-
tivises investment. Therefore, although our results are in general indeterminate, we can precisely
characterise the optimal payment scheme as a function of the price-cost margin and the strategic
relationship between quality and investment.
6.2 Policy options
In this section, we investigate three di¤erent policy options, which reect observed di¤erences in
real-world payment schemes across di¤erent countries. To do so, without much loss of generality, we
restrict the payment contract to the linear specications p (Ii) = p0+p1Ii and T (Ii) = T0+T1Ii. We
also only focus on the (more realistic) sequential game solution, implying that welfare is measured
by
W (I; q) = v +B(I; q)  t
4
  c(I; q)  2k(I): (33)
6.2.1 Paying separately for investment
Consider a policy that introduces a payment rule which rewards investment in health technologies
through the lump-sum payment to cover part or all of the capital costs, on top of the DRG per-
treatment payment, which is line with arrangements in Germany, Ireland, Norway, Portugal and
Spain (Quentin et al., 2011). Analytically, the payment rule before the policy is p (Ii) = p0,
T (Ii) = T 0, and after the policy it is p (Ii) = p0, T (Ii) = T 0 + T1Ii, with T 0 > T 0 and T1 > 0.
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Given that changes in T 0 and T 0 have no e¤ect on quality and investment, the only e¤ect on welfare
is driven by the introduction of T1. Thus, we can assess the e¤ect of the reform by applying the




































where the denitions of  > 0 and VqI ? 0, and further details, are given in Appendix A3.2.
The e¤ect of the reform on the equilibrium level of investment is straightforward. A marginal
increase in T1 increases the marginal revenue of investment and therefore leads to higher investment.
It also leads to higher service quality if investment and quality are complements (VqI > 0), but to
lower service quality if they are substitutes (VqI < 0).
Suppose that, pre-reform, equilibrium investment and quality are below the rst best level
(@W (I; q)=@I > 0 and @W (I; q)=@q > 0). For example, this could arise if the DRG price
is below the rst-best level, p0 < ep (I), there are no payments associated to additional hospital
investments, @ eT (I) =@Ii = @ep (I) =@Ii = 0, own investment and rivals quality are strategic
complements (@qj=@Ii > 0) and hospitals are su¢ ciently prot oriented. Then the introduction of
a payment which incentivises investment separately is always welfare improving when investment
and quality are complements (VqI > 0), or if quality and investment are substitutes as long as the
degree of substitutability is su¢ ciently small. This policy is also welfare improving if equilibrium
investment is below the rst best level and equilibrium quality is above the rst best level (i.e.,
@W (I; q)=@I > 0 and @W (I; q)=@q < 0) if investments and qualities are substitutes (VqI <
0) or if they are complements but the degree of complementarity is su¢ ciently small.
The results are reversed when investment and quality are above the rst best level (@W (I; q)=@I <
0 and @W (I; q)=@q < 0). Then the introduction of a payment scheme which nancially re-
wards investment is always welfare reducing if investment and quality are complements, or if they
are substitutes but the degree of substitutability is su¢ ciently small. The policy is still welfare
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reducing when equilibrium investment is above the rst best level and equilibrium quality is below
the rst best level (i.e., @W (I; q)=@I < 0 and @W (I; q)=@q > 0), if investment and quality
are substitutes, or if they are complements but the degree of complementarity su¢ ciently small.
In summary, the e¤ect of a policy that pays separately for investment is driven by whether
investment levels are above or below the rst best level under two di¤erent scenarios: (i) indirect
welfare e¤ects through changes in service quality are su¢ ciently small or (ii) the quality welfare
e¤ects go in the same direction as the investment welfare e¤ects.
6.2.2 Paying for investment through a higher DRG price
Consider a policy which replaces a payment rule where investment is paid through a separate
lump-sum payment with one that includes payment for capital costs exclusively through the DRG
per-treatment payment, like in countries such as Austria, England, Estonia, Finland, Netherlands,
Sweden and Switzerland (Scheller-Kreinsen et al., 2011). Analytically, before the policy the pay-
ment rule is p (Ii) = p0, T (Ii) = T0, and after the reform it is p (Ii) = p0, T (Ii) = 0, with p0 > p0
and T0 > 0. Given that changes in T0 have no e¤ect on quality and investment, the only e¤ect
on welfare is driven by the increase in the DRG tari¤. We can therefore assess the e¤ects of this

















































and where the expressions for VII < 0, Vqq < 0, VqI ? 0 and VIq ? 0 are given in Appendix A3.2.
A higher DRG tari¤ has a direct positive e¤ect on the marginal revenue of service quality, given
by the rst term in the square brackets of (39). A similar positive e¤ect applies to the marginal
revenue of investment, but here there is also an additional e¤ect related to the strategic incentive
to a¤ect the rival hospitals quality provision through own investment. The sum of these two e¤ects
is given by the rst term in the square brackets of (38), where the sign of the additional (strategic)
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e¤ect depends on the sign of @qj (I) =@Ii. More specically, a higher DRG tari¤ increases the
prot margin and therefore reinforces the incentive to increase (reduce) own investment in order to
induce a reduction in the rivals quality provision if own investment and rivals quality are strategic
substitutes (complements). Finally, there are also indirect e¤ects determined by how a quality
increase a¤ects the marginal incentives for investment (VIq) and how higher investments a¤ect the
marginal incentives for quality provision (VqI).
If we assume that the latter e¤ects are su¢ ciently small (i.e, that the e¤ects through VqI and
VIq are second-order e¤ects), then an increase in the DRG tari¤ increases the marginal revenue of
both investment and service quality, yielding @I=@p0 > 0 and @q=@p0 > 0, if own investment
and rivals quality are strategic substitutes (@qj (I) =@Ii < 0). This also holds if own investment
and rivals quality are strategic complements, as long the degree of strategic complementarity is
su¢ ciently small. If the equilibrium investment and quality are below the rst best level, then this
policy is always welfare improving. Analogously, if they are above the rst best level, the policy
is welfare reducing. If either equilibrium investment or quality is above the rst best level with
the other variable being below the rst best level, then the overall e¤ect of this policy reform is in
general indeterminate.
6.2.3 Incentivising investment through renements in DRG pricing
Finally, consider a policy which incentivises investment through the per-treatment price, in the sense
that higher investments imply a higher DRG tari¤. Several health systems have introduced a new
DRGin the form of an additional DRG price associated with a new technology, that e¤ectively leads
to a higher per-treatment price whenever the new technology is adopted. Examples include coronary
stents in Australia, Austria, Canada, England, Germany, Japan and the United States (Hernandez
et al., 2015; Sorenson et al., 2013, 2015), and transcatheter aortic-valve implantation (TAVI) in
France, intracranial neurostimulators in Portugal, and Implantable cardioverter-debrillator in Italy
(Sorenson et al., 2015; Cappellaro et al., 2009). Analytically, before the policy the payment rule is
p (Ii) = p0, T (Ii) = T 0, and after the reform it is p (Ii) = p0 + p1Ii, T (Ii) = T 0, with T 0 > T 0.
Given that changes in T0 have no e¤ect on quality and investment, the only e¤ect on welfare is
driven by the increase in the DRG tari¤. We can therefore assess the welfare e¤ect of this policy

























































(p(I)  c(I; q)) ? 0; (43)












is the e¤ect of a marginal increase in p0 on investment incentives for a given quality level.
This particular policy a¤ects incentives for investment and quality provision in two di¤erent
ways. First, it implies an increase in the DRG price level. This means that the direct e¤ect on the
marginal revenue of quality provision is similar to the policy in the previous section (the rst term in
(39) is similar to the rst term in (42)). The direct e¤ects on investment incentives are also present
under this policy, and captured by the rst term in (43). However, incentivising investment through
a renement of DRG pricing yields two additional e¤ects on the marginal revenue of investment,
given by the second and third terms in (43). Both of these additional e¤ects result from the fact that
an increase in p1 implies that investments have a stronger positive e¤ect on the price-cost margin.
Firstly, this directly strengthens the incentive for investment. Secondly, this also implies that the
e¤ect of own investment on rivals quality increases, as explained in Section 5.1.8 In other words,
the strategic complementarity is reinforced (or the strategic substitutability is weakened) between
own investment and rivals quality. All else equal, this e¤ect leads to weaker (stronger) investment
incentives if the equilibrium price-cost margin is positive (negative). Finally, and similarly to the

















previous policy, the overall e¤ects of the policy are also determined by how a quality change a¤ects
the marginal incentives for investment (VIq) and vice versa (VqI). Once more, it seems reasonable
to assume that the latter e¤ects are second-order e¤ects and that the sign of the overall e¤ects are
primarily determined by the direct e¤ects described above.
Based on the direct e¤ects, incentivising investment through the DRG price leads to higher
quality provision while, perhaps surprisingly, the e¤ect on investment is a priori indeterminate.
Su¢ cient (but not necessary) conditions for this payment scheme to stimulate investment are
that (i) own investment and rivals quality are strategic substitutes (@qj (I) =@Ii < 0) and (ii)
providers are su¢ ciently altruistic, such that the price-cost margin is negative in equilibrium. On
the contrary, if own investment and rivals quality are strategic complements and providers are
prot oriented, incentivising investment through the DRG price might possibly reduce investments
due to each providers incentive to strategically a¤ect the rivals quality provision through own
investment.
As before, the overall welfare e¤ect of the reform depends crucially on whether quality and
investments are below or above the rst-best levels prior to the policy. In the former case (i.e.,
@W (I; q)=@q > 0 and @W (I; q)=@I > 0), the policy will unambiguously increase welfare if
@I=@p1 > 0 and @q=@p1 > 0. On the other hand, if the policy is counterproductive in terms
of stimulating investment incentives (@I=@p1 < 0), which is a theoretical possibility as explained
above, then it has an unambiguously positive e¤ect on welfare only if the pre-policy equilibrium is
characterised by underprovision of service quality but overinvestment in medical technology.
7 Concluding remarks
Hospital investments in medical innovations and new technologies can a¤ect both health outcomes
and provider costs. This study has investigated how hospitals make investment decisions, and
the circumstances under which they lead to under- or overinvestment, and how these investment
decisions a¤ect the provision of service quality under a range of payment arrangements. Although
the results are generally indeterminate, we can characterise them in a precise way. We show that
hospitals underinvest if (i) own investment and the quality of the competing hospital are strategic
complements and the price-cost margin is positive or (ii) own investment and quality are strategic
substitutes and the price-cost margin is negative. Instead hospitals overinvest in the reversed
scenarios (investment and quality are strategic complements and price-cost margin is negative;
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strategic substitution and positive price-cost margin).
In terms of optimal price regulation, we show that the regulator must complement the per-
treatment price with at least one more instrument to correctly incentivise investments, either
through a separate payment which rewards investment or a treatment price which depends on
investment. The results mirror our key ndings. The regulator has to incentivise investment when
(i) investment and quality are strategic complements and the provider works at a positive price
cost-margin, or (ii) investment and quality are strategic substitutes and the provider works at a
negative price cost margin.
In terms of policy implications, our analysis informs possible policy interventions under current
activity-based payment arrangements that set, in most countries, prices at the average cost instead
of relating them to marginal costs as prescribed by optimal regulation theory. We show that the
introduction of a policy with a separate payment which directly incentivises investment, commonly
used in several countries, can be welfare improving if investment and quality are initially below
the rst-best levels and investment and quality are complements or if they are substitutes but
the degree of substitutability is su¢ ciently small. This is also the case if investment is below and
quality is above the rst-best levels, and investment and quality are either substitutes or su¢ ciently
weak complements. In other scenarios, the introduction of this payment rule will create trade-o¤s
between the welfare e¤ects arising from changes in investment and quality.
Some countries pay for investment through a higher activity-based tari¤ per patient treated,
while others through a separate funding scheme. We show that the former is welfare improving
if investment and quality are below the rst-best level and a higher DRG tari¤ increases the
marginal revenue of both investment and service quality. However, this may not be the case if
either investment or quality is above the rst-best level, so that a trade-o¤ arises. Finally, we
nd that a policy incentivising investment through renements of DRG pricing (so that additional
investments are rewarded with a higher per unit price) stimulates quality provision while the e¤ect
on investment is, perhaps surprisingly, a priori ambiguous. In this case, even if both quality and
investment are below the rst-best level, a trade-o¤ arises between the welfare gain from higher
quality and welfare loss from lower investment.
Our analysis highlights the role of two main factors. The rst is whether providers work at
a positive or negative price-cost margin. This is likely to depend on the health system, with
systems with fewer beds per capita and higher capacity constraints more likely to work a negative
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price-cost margin. This may also be the case for countries that use mixed payment systems. For
example, in Norway activity-based payment only covers about 50-60% of average costs, with the
rest being covered by a capitation arrangement. There are also discussions in England of moving
towards blendedpayment systems with the activity-based payment accounting for as little as 30%
(Appleby et al., 2012). Future empirical work on empirical estimates of marginal treatment costs
could also quantify the size of price-cost margins.
A second key factor is whether investment and quality are complements or substitutes for each
provider, or strategic complements or substitutes across providers. This is also an area that could
be informed by future empirical work. For example, it would be useful to estimate whether an
exogenous increase in hospital investments lead to an increase (complementarity) or a reduction
(substitution) in service provision by the same provider, as these e¤ects play an important role
in the welfare analysis of policy interventions. Perhaps even more important, but also empirically
challenging, would be to investigate how changes in provider investment a¤ect the quality of rival
providers. These could be explored using a spatial econometrics approach similar to the one adopted
to investigate whether the qualities are strategic complements or substitutes (Gravelle et al., 2014;
Longo et al., 2017).
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Appendix
This appendix contains second-order conditions and supplementary calculations for each part of
the analysis, where the content of Appendix A1, A2 and A3 complements the analysis of Section
4, 5 and 6, respectively.
A1. Simultaneous game
The second-order conditions of the hospital are given by










  2cqDi < 0; (A1)
































where @2Vi=@Ii@qi is given by (A13) below. These conditions are satised if k(Ii) is su¢ ciently
convex.
A2. Sequential game
A2.1 Derivation of (12) and (13)
The optimality conditions of quality, @Vi (Ii; Ij ; qi; qj) =@qi = 0 and @Vj (Ii; Ij ; qi; qj) =@qj = 0, are

























Dj(Ii; Ij ; qi; qj) = 0: (A5)






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































A2.2 Second order condition


















































2t [p(Ii)  c(Ii; qi)]
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< 0; (A23)










































































































The condition in (A23) holds if k(Ii) is su¢ ciently convex.
A2.3 Symmetric equilibrium





































































































A3.1 Second order conditions
The second order conditions for rst-best quality and investments are given by
@2W
@q2i

























These conditions hold if k(Ii) is su¢ ciently convex.
A3.2 Comparative Statics
Considering the subgame-perfect Nash Equilibrium implicitly dened by (19)-(20), the comparative
statics results reported in Section 6.2 are found by total di¤erentiation of this system and the





































































[p(I)  c(I; q)] (A39)
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where 	 is the derivative of (21) with respect to I: Dening  as the numerator in (21), we have

























































































































(p(I)  c(I; q)) 7 0; (A43)
where  is the derivative of (21) with respect to q and given by  = (q  q) =4t2, where
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